Introduction {#Sec1}
============

Games with a continuum of atomless (or infinitesimal) players have since long ago been used to model interactions involving a large number of players, in which the action of a single player has a negligible impact on the utilities of other players. In road traffic engineering, for example, this was already formalized by Wardrop \[[@CR1]\] in 1952 to model the choice of routes of cars where each driver, modeled as an atomless player, minimizes its expected travel delay. In Wardrop's model, there may be several classes of players, each corresponding to another origin-destination pair. The goal is to determine, what fraction of each class of players would use the different possible paths available to that class. The equilibrium is known to behave as the limit of the equilibria obtained in games with finitely many players, as their number tends to infinity \[[@CR2]\]. It is also the limit of Nash equilibria for some sequence of dynamic games in which randomness tends to average away as the number of players increases \[[@CR3]\].

Another class of games that involves a continuum of atomless players is evolutionary games, in which pairs of players that play a matrix game are selected at random, see \[[@CR4]\]. Our objective is again to predict the fraction of the population (or of populations in the case of several classes) that plays each possible action at equilibrium. A Wardrop type definition of equilibrium can be used, although there has been a particular interest in a more robust notion of equilibrium strategy, called Evolutionary Stable Strategy (we refer the reader to \[[@CR5], [@CR6]\]).

In both games described above, the player's type is fixed, and the actions of the players determine directly their utilities.

Extensions of these models are needed, whenever the player's class may change randomly in time, and when the utility of a player depends not only on the current actions of players but also on future interactions. The class of the player is called its individual state. The choice of an action by a player should then take into account not only the game played at the present state but also the future state evolution. We are interested in particular in the case where the action of a player not only impacts the current utility but also the transition probabilities to the next state.

In this paper, we study this type of extension in the framework of the first type of game, in which a player interacts with an infinite number of other players. (In the road traffic context, the interaction is modeled through link delays, each of which depends on the total amount of traffic that uses that link.) We build upon the framework of anonymous sequential games, introduced by Jovanovic and Rosenthal in 1988 in \[[@CR7]\]. In that work, each player's utility is given as the expected discounted utility over an infinite horizon. The theory of anonymous sequential games with discounted utilities was further developed in \[[@CR8]--[@CR12]\]. Conditions under which Nash equilibria in finite-player discounted-utility games converge to equilibria of respective anonymous models were analyzed in \[[@CR13]--[@CR16]\]. Also applications of this kind of models were numerous: from stochastic growth \[[@CR17]\] and industry dynamics \[[@CR18]--[@CR21]\] models to dynamic auctions \[[@CR22]--[@CR24]\] and strategic market games \[[@CR25], [@CR26]\]. Surprisingly, the cases of expected average utility and total expected utility have remained open ever since 1988, even though this kind of models were applied in some networking contexts \[[@CR27], [@CR28]\]. Our main contribution in this paper is giving conditions, under which such extensions are possible.

Similar extensions have been proposed and studied for the framework of evolutionary games in \[[@CR29], [@CR30]\]. The analysis there turns out to be simpler, since the utility in each encounter between two players turns out to be bilinear there.

The structure of the paper is as follows. We begin with a section that presents the model and introduces in particular the expected average and the total expected reward criteria. The two following sections establish the existence of stationary equilibria for the average and the total reward (Sects. [3](#Sec5){ref-type="sec"} and [4](#Sec6){ref-type="sec"}, respectively). Section [5](#Sec7){ref-type="sec"} is concerned with showing that the equilibria for models of the two previous chapters that deal with infinite number of players are limits of those obtained for some games with a large finite number of players, as this number goes to infinity. We end with two sections that show how our results apply to some real-life examples, followed by two paragraphs, containing open problems and conclusions.

The Model {#Sec2}
=========
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Average Reward {#Sec3}
--------------

We define the *long-time average reward* of a player using stationary policy $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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### *Remark 2.1* {#FPar1}

The definition of the equilibrium used here differs significantly from that used in \[[@CR7]\]. There the stationary equilibrium is defined as a state-action distribution $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Total Reward {#Sec4}
------------
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The notion of equilibrium for the total reward case will be slightly different from that for the average reward. We define a stationary strategy $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Existence of the Stationary Equilibrium in Average-Reward Case {#Sec5}
==============================================================

In the present section, we present a result about the existence of stationary equilibrium in anonymous sequential games with long-time average reward. We prove it under the following assumption:
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Assumption (A1) appears often in the literature on Markov decision processes with average cost and is referred to as "weakly communicating" property, see e.g., \[[@CR32]\], chapters 8 and 9.[4](#Fn4){ref-type="fn"} It guarantees that the optimal gain in a Markov decision process satisfying it is independent of its initial state. As we will see, it also guarantees that this optimal gain is continuous in $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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*Example 3.1* {#FPar2}
-------------
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Now we are ready to formulate the main result of this section.
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---------------

Every anonymous sequential game with long-time average payoff satisfying (A1) has a stationary equilibrium.
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**Lemma 3.1** {#FPar4}
-------------
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Existence of the Stationary Equilibrium in Total Reward Case {#Sec6}
============================================================

In this section, we show that also for the total reward case under some fairly mild assumptions, the game has an equilibrium. What we will assume is the following:
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We write that this assumption is fairly mild, as it is not only necessary for our theorem to hold but also for the total cost model to make sense, as it is trivially shown in an example below.

*Example 4.1* {#FPar9}
-------------
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*Remark 4.1* {#FPar10}
------------

The total reward model, specifically when (T1) is assumed, bears a lot of resemblance to an exponentially discounted model where the discount factor is allowed to fluctuate over time, which suggests that the results in the two models should not differ much. Note, however, that there is one essential difference between these two models. The 'discount factor' in the total reward model (which is the ratio of those who stay alive after a given period to those who were alive at its beginning) appears not only in the cumulative reward of the players but also in the stationary state of the game, and thus also in the per-period rewards of the players. Thus this is an essentially different (and slightly more complex) problem. On the other hand, the fact that each of the players lives for a finite period and then is replaced by another player, with a fixed fraction of players dead and fixed fractions of players in each of the states when the game is in a stationary state, makes this model similar to the average reward one. In fact, using the renewal theorem, we can relate the rewards of the players in the total reward model with those in the respective average-reward model. This relation is used a couple of times in our proofs.

Now we can formulate our main result of this section.

**Theorem 4.1** {#FPar11}
---------------

Every anonymous sequential game with total reward satisfying (T1) has a stationary equilibrium.

As in the case of the average reward, we start by defining some additional notation. Let $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\overline{\mathcal {M}}(\tau )$$\end{document}$ be a modified Markov decision process of an individual faced with a fixed (over time) distribution of state-action pairs of all the other players. This modification is slight but important, namely we assume that in $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\overline{\mathcal {M}}(\tau )$$\end{document}$ the state $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$s_0$$\end{document}$ is absorbing, and the reward in this state is always 0. This is a classic MDP with total reward, as considered in the literature. For this fixed $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\tau \in \Delta (S\times A)$$\end{document}$, let $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\overline{J}^\tau (f,\rho )$$\end{document}$ denote the total payoff in this process when the player uses stationary policy $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$f$$\end{document}$, and the initial distribution of states is $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\rho $$\end{document}$, and let $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\overline{G}(\tau )$$\end{document}$ denote the optimal reward in $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\overline{\mathcal {M}}(\tau )$$\end{document}$ that is$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\begin{aligned} \overline{G}(\tau )=\sup _{f:S\rightarrow A}\overline{J}^\tau (f,Q(\cdot |s_0,a_0,\tau )). \end{aligned}$$\end{document}$$We can prove the following auxiliary result:

**Lemma 4.1** {#FPar12}
-------------
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*Proof* {#FPar13}
-------

By a well-known result from the theory of Markov decision processes (see e.g., \[[@CR32]\], Lemma 7.1.8 -- assumption of this lemma is satisfied as a consequence of assumption (T1) and the fact that function $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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The Relation with Games with Finitely Many Players {#Sec7}
==================================================

Main point of criticism of anonymous games in general is that the limiting situation with an infinite number of players does not exist in reality, and thus it is not sure that the results obtained for a continuum of players are relevant for the real-life ones, when the number of players is finite, but large. In this section, we present some results connecting the anonymous game models from previous sections with similar models with finitely many players. In these results we will, in addition, use the following two assumptions.
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The assumptions similiar to (AT1) appear in a recent paper \[[@CR39]\] on stochastic games with a finite number of players and average reward. They are also used in some papers on Markov evolutionary games \[[@CR29]\] and in a recent application of anonymous sequential games to model power control problem in a wireless network \[[@CR27]\]. It allows to decouple the Markov chains of individual states for each of the players (so that the dependence between different players is only through rewards)---this decoupling is crucial in our proofs of convergence of games with finite number of players to respective anonymous models. Importantly though, in most engineering applications individual state of a player is either his energy (or some other private resource) level or his geographical position for which assumption (AT1) is naturally satisfied.
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A stronger result is true for the average-reward game.

**Theorem 5.2** {#FPar16}
---------------
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*Proof of Theorem5.1* {#FPar17}
---------------------
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Application: Medium Access Game {#Sec8}
===============================

In the remainder of the paper, we present two simple examples of application of our framework to model some real-life phenomena.

The Model {#Sec9}
---------

The first example we present is a medium access game (MAC) between mobile phones. We are inspired by a power control game studied in \[[@CR30]\] that considered a Markov Decision Evolutionary Game (MDEG) framework, which can be viewed as a special case of an anonymous sequential game (ASG), where the level of the power used for transmission is controlled. The total energy available for transmission is assumed to be constrained by the battery energy level, and the objective of a user is to maximize the amount of successful transmissions of packets taking into account the fact that the lifetime of its battery is limited. The MDEG framework is restricted to pairwise interactions, so that formalism was used under the assumption of a sparse network. The MAC game problem that we shall study below will show how this type of restriction can be removed by using the ASG framework (instead of the MDEG framework). The model can be described as follows: Time is slotted. At any given time $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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The Solution {#Sec10}
------------

Stationary state of the chain of private states of a player using policy $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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### *Remark 6.1* {#FPar19}

It is worth noting here that some generalizations of the model presented above can be considered. We can assume that there are more energy levels and more powers at which players could transmit in our game (similarly as in \[[@CR27]\]). We can also assume that the players do not always transmit, only with some positive probability (then the individual state becomes two-dimensional, consisting of player's energy state and an indicator of whether he has something to transmit or not). Both these generalizations are tractable within our framework, though the computations become more involved.

The Case of Linear Utility: Maintenance-Repair Example {#Sec11}
======================================================

General Linear Framework {#Sec12}
------------------------

In the next example we consider a game satisfying some additional assumptions. Let $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Maintenance-Repair Game: The Model {#Sec13}
----------------------------------

The maintenance-repair example presented below can be seen as a toy model. Its main purpose, however, is to show, how the abovementioned method can be used in a concrete game satisfying the linearity conditions mentioned above.

Each car among a large number of cars is supposed to drive one unit of distance per day. A car is in one of the **individual states:** good ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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A single driver is assumed to be infinitesimally "small" in the sense that its contribution to the congestion experienced by other cars is negligible.

We assume that there are two types of behavior of drivers. Those that drive gently, and those that take risks and drive fast. This choice is modeled mathematically through **two actions:** aggressive ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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The Solution {#Sec14}
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Perspectives {#Sec15}
============

The framework analyzed in this paper generalizes that of Jovanovic and Rosenthal \[[@CR7]\], addressing the cases of expected average reward and total expected reward, which have not yet been studied in the literature. Lack of this kind of results so far is not so unexpected, if we take into account that game-theoretic tools were for many decades used mostly in economic contexts, where discounted rewards are usually more appropriate in multistage models. The time scales that are of interest in dynamic games applied to Engineering, and in particular to telecommunication networks, are often much faster than those occurring in economic models, which makes reward criteria focusing on the long-run behavior of the analyzed systems more appropriate. These are young and quickly developing fields of application of game theory that generate those new models.

Our paper tries to fill in the existing gap. It has to be noticed, however, that a lot remains to be done. First of all, the results presented here are limited to the games with finite state and action spaces. One natural generalization would be finding conditions for equilibria to exist in analogous games played on infinite, and possibly noncompact, state, and action sets. Second interesting problem is, whether similar results hold, when the global state of the game does not converge to some stationary distribution, at least under some subclass of stationary policies. In such a case not only the proofs may become more involved, but also the notion of equilibrium needs redefining. Finally, for applications it may be quite important to extend the present model to semi-Markov case, where the moments when a player makes his decisions remain discrete but follow some controlled impulse process.

Another important issue, addressed just briefly in Sect. [7.1](#Sec12){ref-type="sec"}, concerns designing tools for computing equilibria in such games. As it is widely known, one of the main problems when dealing with dynamic games, stochastic games in particular, when the number of players becomes large, is the so-called *curse of dimensionality*--in stochastic games the sizes of state and action spaces growing exponentially being a particular problem. Although equilibrium-existence results often exist for games with big finite number of players, the computation becomes impossible usually already for a relatively small number. The anonymous game formulation simplifies visibly the structure of the game and thus gives much bigger chances of computing the equilibria, which then could be used as approximate equilibria for the models with large finite number of players. In addition, the equilibria computed for the limiting, anonymous case, may have (under appropriate conditions) a property, used in Medium Access Game example presented in Sect. [6](#Sec8){ref-type="sec"} that they are equally good approximations of equilibria of games with a different large number of players, which can be used when the exact number of players is unknown. In Sect. [7.1](#Sec12){ref-type="sec"} we present a way to transform the problem of finding equilibrium in an anonymous game with linear utilities into that of finding an equilibrium in a bimatrix game. Designing similar tools for more general case is another important problem to solve.

Finally, the resemblance of the framework considered in this paper to that of the classical traffic assignment problem suggests, it may be natural to try to extend tools from the traffic assignment framework to the one studied in this paper, such as the convergence of dynamic decentralized learning schemes (e.g., the replicator dynamics). More generally, it remains to study, whether anonymous sequential games provide good approximations for similar games but with finitely many players, and vice versa. Our paper answers this question only in a very limited range, while this type of question is frequently asked in mean field games, which are games played by an infinite population of players, see \[[@CR40]\] and references therein.

Conclusions {#Sec16}
===========

The framework of the game defined in this paper is similar in nature to the classical traffic assignment problem in that it has an infinity of players. In both frameworks, players can be in different states. In the classical traffic assignment problem, a class can be characterized by a source-destination pair, or by a vehicle type (car, pedestrian or bicycle). In contrast to the traffic assignment problem, the class of a player in our setting can change in time. Transition probabilities that govern this change may depend not only on the individual's state but also on the fraction of players that are in each individual state and that use different actions. Furthermore, these transitions are controlled by the player. A strategy of a player of a given class in the classical traffic assignment problem can be identified as the probability it would choose a given action (path) among those available to its class (or its "state"). The definition of a strategy in our case is similar, except that now the probability for choosing different actions should be specified not just in one state.

Our paper provides definitions and tools for the study of anonymous sequential games with the total cost and with the average cost criteria, which have not been covered in the existing literature. It provides conditions for the existence of stationary equilibrium, and illustrates through several examples, how to compute it. The contribution of the paper is not only in extending previous results to new cost criteria but also in providing an appropriate definition of equilibria for the new cost criteria.
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Note that its transition is deterministic.

Note that we assume this stationary policy may depend on $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\tau $$\end{document}$, as we consider the properties of the Markov chain of individual states of a player under fixed state-action distribution of all the other players.

All the properties appearing in the assumptions are commonly used in the Markov decision processes literature. Those readers who are not familiar with them or are interested in mutual relationships between these properties are referred to \[[@CR31], [@CR33]\].

The example is a reworking of Example 3. in \[[@CR34]\].

Of course a stationary policy is only a function of individual state $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Note that a measure over the set of states of an aperiodic Markov process can be invariant, only if it is a convex combination of unique invariant measures on each of the ergodic classes. The coefficients of this convex combination are exactly the $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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